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Mark Phythian has recruited the top academics in the Intelligence field to 
address that never-ending question:  How useful is the intelligence cycle?   On 
the one hand, all of the authors point out that the cycle isn’t entirely accurate.  
It’s definitely missing a few steps and/or (depending on one’s position in the 
cycle), simplifying the process.  On the other hand, the authors acknowledge 
that its replacement is far from uniform.  The problem is in picking one’s 
poison: inaccuracy or hyper-complexity.  If the cycle is too simple to be 
accurate, then intelligence professionals and observers need an alternative.  If 
the cycle is entirely accurate, then it is likely too complex to be useful.  Given 
the multiple agencies, varied systems, conflicting objectives, and demanding 
customers across many interested nations, one cycle may not fit all.  This 
book presents more than one replacement — some simpler than others — 
which is, of course, the problem with which we began. 
 
Understanding the Intelligence Cycle gives readers some background on the 
choice of metaphors for the cycle, as well as multiple substitute options.  The 
background comes from historian, Michael Warner, who tells us that cycle 
started when French revolutionaries needed a means to explain intelligence 
collection to their increasingly specialized military staffs. Indeed, it was the 
voracious appetite for intelligence during wartime in Europe from the 18th 
and 19th centuries that moved military organizations to codify their 
intelligence processes into a flexible yet accurate description of their behavior. 
Warner asserts that the graphic depiction of a cycle became a popular 
talisman even as governments moved beyond the simple linear process it 
described.  Omand agrees that the current intelligence cycle may have 
outlived its usefulness. Its static reflection of the roughly equivalent and 
stalemated world during the Cold War is outdated.  We may want to keep the 
current cycle, he posits, but it will need to be augmented with situational 
awareness, explanatory value, prediction, and strategic notice. He submits 
that these additional complexities will make the cycle more responsive to 
external demands and changing social attitudes. 
 
As currently used, the Intelligence Cycle is a constant, reiterative, cyclical 
feedback loop that neatly describes a step-by-step, time consuming process 
that accommodates the information needs of government decision makers 
with the capabilities of the providers.  It typically has four or five steps 
involving: 1. Planning, 2. Collection, 3. Processing, 4. Analysis, and 5. 
Dissemination.  In the digital, speedy, information age, when collectors work 
simultaneously with the analysts, and consumers use and consume more 
information than ever, Phythian asks how relevant is the cycle.  Information 
has become a firehose, and the cycle can’t handle it.  Is it time to move beyond 
the cycle, and what would replace it? 
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Some authors substitute a web for the cycle.  From Gill and Phythian, we 
learn that the extreme simplicity of the linear cycle is outdated and unhelpful.  
Intelligence is collected, analyzed, distributed, and used at multiple, complex 
levels, and the cycle should reflect that modern entanglement with a web.  
Their web is accurate and complicated, including at one point, no fewer than 
thirteen caveats, illustrated with no fewer than seventeen arrows, indicating 
multiple directions and descriptions. 
 
Richards substitutes a Venn Diagram for the cycle. Simplifying the current 
cycle, he focuses on the two main parts:  policymakers and intelligence 
producers. The diagram compresses collectors and analysts into one side so 
that we don’t need to distinguish raw and finished intelligence.  His model 
focuses on the questions and the answers, arguing that it doesn’t need more 
than that to aid intelligence professionals in their jobs. 
 
Some authors substitute a multi-directional loop for the cycle.  This resembles 
a juggler riding a unicycle while multiple plates whirl about. As the alternative 
cycles pile up for the reader’s consideration, the complexity induces one to 
wonder whether the cycle is necessary at all. Do we really need a cycle to 
describe how intelligence works? Might we just be able to collect, disseminate, 
analyze, and direct intelligence without a graphic depiction of the enterprise?  
The essay by Davies, Gustafson, and Rigden throws this thought out the 
window by describing the 2009 UK Ministry of Defence attempt to review the 
old cycle and create a new, universally acceptable paradigm for joint military 
use across multiple nations.  Their focus on core functions tells us that the 
process is just as important as the product because the cycle is continuous, 
not linear. After a lengthy treatment of its advantages and disadvantages, we 
learn that the 2009 review process stuck with the image of a cycle but added 
multi-directional arrows and a starburst of feedback and dialogue to more 
accurately reflect what is happening, as well as what should happen, in the 
intelligence process. 
 
Brantly’s cycle is focused on a new threat: cyber warfare.  He argues that the 
current cycle is defensive and reactionary, and it needs to both push 
intelligence into the cyber arena and pull intelligence out of it.  The resulting 
need to have an inductive quality prevents the intelligence cycle from 
enforcing one theoretical approach on all intelligence; it must respond to the 
new threats. 
 
Sheptycki applies the cycle to another specific area of security: police work.  
He agrees that the uni-directional nature of the current intelligence cycle 
hinders the creativity and inductive quality of good policing. Rather than 
focusing on management guided intelligence collection, or the simplistic 
equation of threats and responses, policing needs to be oriented around 
human security. 
 
Strachan-Morris tells us that intelligence in the corporate world tends to 
reflect business requirements on an “as-needed” basis. Thus, the static 
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depiction of our current cycle misses out on relationships; it’s not fast enough 
to assimilate changing needs.   
 
Arthur Hulnick proposes a matrix model with four main tasks: collection, 
analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action.  There are two ways of 
accomplishing these tasks:  process and sequence.  Process tells us that 
intelligence duties are conducted in parallel to each other, not sequentially.  
Sequence, meanwhile, shows us that none of intelligence works in isolation. 
All tasks, all processes, are in motion simultaneously. If we cannot 
incorporate concurrent feedback and influence in our model of intelligence 
operations, then we are too far removed from reality to be helpful. 
 
Let’s return to our original question:  How useful is the intelligence cycle to 
our current operations?  To answer that question, if the intelligence cycle is 
supposed to accurately depict how governments learn and react to new 
information, then this book tells us that the cycle has to change. If the 
intelligence cycle is supposed to show how intelligence ought to be collected, 
analyzed, and disseminated, this book again tells us that the cycle has to 
change.  So, we have to conclude that the cycle is not especially useful, and 
every author in this book agrees that it needs an overhaul. 
 
To the un-initiated, this book may seem too detailed and arcane. To the 
intelligence newcomer, it may even appear overly self-absorbed.  Indeed, the 
edited book is accurate, possibly to point of tedium.  Understanding the 
intelligence cycle is a central question in academic circles, and this book is 
right there in the middle of the literature, but does it need to be so detailed?  
Phythian thinks so, and this book accurately reflects the debates, alternatives, 
second thoughts, regrets, and hopes that intelligence observers — both inside 
and outside government — have pinned on the intelligence cycle and its 
alternatives.  Ultimately, though, it falls short of offering a universal 
conclusion as to what to do next.   
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